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Introduction
1. The vexed question of which functions are public and amenable to judicial review has generated considerable volumes of case-law and academic discussion over the years. In this piece I consider the general principles in this area before examining their application in three recent cases from 2016. 
General Principles
3. The amenability case-law reveals the following fundamentals.
4. First, the courts' focus is on the nature of the function, not the institutional nature of the defendant itself. Private bodies may perform public functions, e.g. when a private psychiatric hospital uses its statutory powers to detain and treat inpatients against their will: R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 529 (Admin). Conversely, public bodies may perform private functions that are not therefore amenable to judicial review, notably when exercising contractual disciplinary powers (see below).
5. Second, nor is the courts' focus simply on the source of the power, source and nature being distinct. In R v Panel of Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin Plc [1987] QB 815, at 847, Lloyd LJ stated that he did 'not agree that the source of the power is the sole test whether a body is subject to judicial review', and that it could be 'helpful to look not just at the source of the power but at the nature of the power,' in the context of the de facto regulatory power exercised by the Takeover Panel. In R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225, at 246, Simon Brown J observed that Datafin gave 'clear emphasis to the "functions" test as opposed to the "source of power" test'. Appeal ruled that a private company created by a local authority to take over the running a series of farmers' markets was amenable to judicial review when rejecting the claimant's application for permission to participate in the scheme. It was relevant to the decision that the company owed its existence to the local council, had stepped into the shoes of the council by running the markets, and that the council had assisted it in various ways such as providing office space, funding and staff. Their Lordships were clear that these factors were enough in themselves to render the function public.
18. In Weaver (above) the Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant, a registered social landlord that had sought to evict the claimant tenant for rent arrears, was performing a public function when managing and allocating housing stock. Only a small minority (10%) of that stock was transferred from local authority ownership. It was relevant that the defendant 'operated in very close harmony' with local authorities, assisting them to achieve their statutory duties and objectives in the social housing field, and that it was subject to 'intrusive [legislative] regulation on various aspects of allocation and management' that was designed to 'ensure proper standards of performance in the public interest': see 
Holmcroft Properties
30. The case followed the mis-selling of interest rate hedging products by Barclays Bank to some of its customers. Barclays agreed with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) that it would establish a scheme to provide redress to certain customers who had been mis-sold. Under the agreement, KPMG was to oversee the implementation and application of the scheme as an independent party. Barclays was to make no offers of compensation to customers without KPMG's approval. KPMG could only approve offers that it considered appropriate, fair and reasonable.
31. Holmcroft Properties, the claimant, received an offer from Barclays that did not include compensation for consequential loss caused by the mis-sale. Holmcroft sought judicial review, arguing that KPMG's decision to approve the offer was unfair because Barclays' offer was calculated on the basis of undisclosed material. Holmcroft could not therefore advance its case on an informed basis.
32. In a joint judgment, Elias LJ and Mitting J found against Holmcroft on both issues calling for resolution: (i) whether KPMG was amenable to judicial review and (ii) whether its decision to approve the offer breached any of the substantive grounds of review.
As to the amenability issue, their Lordships began by explaining (at [23]) that:
'The principles are tolerably clear, albeit stated at a high level of abstraction, and they are not in dispute in this case. But their application in any particular case can be problematic and it is the application of the principles to the circumstances of this case which divides the parties.' (a) The Barclays-KPMG arrangement was 'more than a mere private arrangement and the bank would never have conferred the veto power upon KPMG [to decline to approve offers] unless required to do so by the FCA as part of its regulatory functions'.
Citing Datafin and
(b) The FCA was required to approve Barclays' initial appointment of KPMG as independent regulator of the compensation scheme.
(c) The arrangement required KPMG to report to the FCA regularly through Barclays. KPMG was not simply assisting Barclays to comply with its own regulatory obligations but was 'undertaking its duties both for Barclays and for the FCA so as to assist the latter in the effective performance of its regulatory functions.' 36. KPMG was therefore 'woven into the regulatory function' of the FCA. There was also a 'clear public connection between its function and the regulatory duties carried out by the FCA' (at [40] ).
37. The factors pointing against publicness nevertheless prevailed:
(a) The FCA could have exercised more draconian powers but instead chose to 'adopt an essentially voluntary scheme of redress' that left Barclays free to 'remedy their own errors' and identify 'unsophisticated customers who had been sold these products improperly ' (at [42] ).
(b) The fact that KPMG's powers were conferred by contract with Barclays was 'important' albeit 'not determinative', and it was relevant that KPMG lacked any direct relationship with Barclays' customers. Moreover, although the FCA approved KPMG's appointment to the role, the appointment was made by Barclays itself (at [43] ).
(c) The mere fact that it could be said that KPMG was carrying out functions 'at the behest of a public body which, if performed by that public body, would be subject to public law principles ', was said (at [44] ) to be insufficient to render it amenable to judicial review.
(d) The FCA had no regulatory obligation to carry out the role played by KPMG had there been no willing skilled advisor like KPMG to do so. This was said (at [45] ) to reinforce the first point, 'that the arrangements were voluntary albeit under the cloud of more drastic statutory sanctions'.
(e) The Barclays-KPMG arrangement did not exclude the FCA 'from taking a more active role in particular cases': at [46] . The FCA would have needed to investigate whether the arrangement was working in the event of a customer complaint that both Barclays and KPMG had acted unfairly, and would potentially be subject to judicial review itself when doing so.
38. The fact that there was no effective redress to ensure that fair and reasonable offers were made was mentioned (at [48]) but evidently not significant. Any public law remedy would be a limited one given that only a civil action could generate damages. The purpose of the arrangement was not to 'guarantee a fair outcome in each and every case' but to 'remedy a pattern of improper selling' with a broad remedial scheme to be implemented 'in good faith [and] with close supervision from an objective and independent party.' Civil actions and possibly Ombudsman complaints could be taken up if the scheme as a whole failed to work as it should.
39. Their Lordships briefly considered and discounted the possibility that there could be a contractual remedy in the event of an unfair and/or unreasonable offer being made, but cited Leech (above) and observed (at [50] ) that the existence of any such remedy would be irrelevant to the question of whether KPMG was amenable to judicial review.
Macleod

40.
The claimant was a tenant of the Peabody Trust at a London property that had been transferred from the Crown Estate Commissioners (CEC). Peabody refused his request to exchange his tenancy with a tenant in Edinburgh. He sought judicial review of the decision. The allegations were that Peabody had unlawfully fettered its discretion and acted irrationally: by failing to follow its own policy in relation to mutual exchange, and failing to take account of its public sector equality duty (PSED) under s 149 of the Equality Act 2010. William Davis J found against the claimant on the amenability issue and on all substantive issues apart from s 149, but would in any event have declined judicial review on that issue because consideration of the PSED would have made no difference to the decision on the facts.
As to the amenability point, his Lordship began (at [15]) by identifying
Weaver (above) as the leading authority in relation to social housing providers and their public-law status. It was said (at [18] ) to be unnecessary to look beyond that decision 'for any issues of principle'. Weaver did not hold that all registered social landlords are amenable to judicial review, and so fell to be applied to the facts (at [20] ). Ruling that Peabody was not amenable to review, his Lordship took the following factors into account (at [20]):
(a) Peabody had purchased CEC properties using 'funds raised on the open market, not via any public subsidy or grant.' (b) It was not clear that these properties were 'pure social housing', even though they were 'not let at a full market rent'.
(c) Peabody was distinct from the landlord in Weaver because it 'was not acting in close harmony with a local authority to assist the local authority to fulfil its statutory duty.' 43. The claimant sought judicial review of both acts. The claim was principally brought on ECHR grounds under the HRA, but he also alleged that the decisions were irrational and unlawful for want of natural justice according to ordinary principles of domestic judicial review. As to the non-HRA claims, Coulson J ruled that neither defendant was amenable to judicial review. In any event, the substantive claims were either time-barred or unpersuasive.
44. As to the non-HRA amenability issue, Coulson J began by observing (at [75] ) that it is 'important to look at the nature of the power being exercised as opposed to simply the source of that power', and that it 'is also important to consider the nature of the body in question'. By this was meant that it was necessary to consider a range of factors such as whether the defendants had stepped into the shoes of central local government, were subsidised by public funds or were democratically accountable -as well as (from Aga Khan, above) the 'further issue about the voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the body in question.' It was also said to be important to consider the 'type of action taken'.
Coulson J made two further notable points (at [76]
). First, citing Wachmann, his Lordship explained that it was 'irrelevant' to the amenability question that 'the decisions in question… have had a significant impact on the claimant'. Second, the argument that the claimant would be left without a remedy was 'also immaterial, because the administrative court [sic.] is not there simply to fill in the gaps left by statute or the common law.' In this regard Coulson J cited the dicta of Hoffmann LJ in Aga Khan (above), about using judicial review to 'patch up' remedies against non-state defendants.
46. The functions of both defendants in safeguarding others were merely private (see [77] ). Neither defendant exercised any statutory powers, which Coulson J believed to 'point to the conclusion that the decisions are not amenable to judicial review'. The defendants were also not part of any system of public regulation and did not receive any public funding. The defendants' acts of controlling bell-ringers' access to church towers was 'analogous to the control of sporting associations', such as the Jockey Club, to their premises and events. The defendants' decisions were merely private, with 'no public element to them'.
Analysis
47. It was unlikely that any of these first-instance cases would break new ground. The main principles are already well established in this area, and it is in the nature of the multi-factorial approach that a considerable range of factors are potentially relevant to the courts' analysis to a greater or lesser degree anyway. Nevertheless, some broad observations about the decisions may be made from the dicta cited above.
First, their Lordships in Holmcroft and
Worcester Cathedral affirm the longstanding view that the courts' overriding concern in the amenability context is the nature of the power. Nevertheless, in both judgments source appears to remain a weighty factor. In Worcester Cathedral the lack of any statutory powers on the defendants' part pointed against amenability. Moreover, both Worcester Cathedral and Holmcroft emphasise the consensual element to the powers in question: controlling bell-ringers' access to churches was likened to the activities of sporting regulators, and it was 'important' that KPMG's powers were conferred by contract with Barclays in order to create a 'voluntary' remedial scheme.
49. Second, all three judgments show that institutional factors nevertheless continue to play an important role. In Worcester Cathedral Coulson J expressly mentioned that it was necessary to consider the nature of the body in question, and identified as relevant the fact that neither defendant was part of a system of public regulation. In Macleod, Peabody was distinguished from the landlord in Weaver because it lacked the same close relationship with local authorities and enmeshment in a statutory regulatory regime. In Holmcroft it was said to tell in favour of review that KPMG had been woven into the FCA's regulatory function, albeit that countervailing factors telling against review eventually prevailed. Publicness is therefore about more than mere power, or than the injustice of a function being exercised without regulation in judicial review.
51.
Fourth, Holmcroft appears to make thinly-veiled reference to the 'but for' test. It was said to be relevant that the FCA had no regulatory obligation to perform KPMG's role had no skilled advisor performed it. The case therefore represents another example of the test being applied but unsatisfied. Leaving aside Baker Tilly (above), in which the amenability point was agreed rather than argued by the parties, it seems doubtful that any defendant could satisfy the 'but for' test in the absence of very close institutional links of the sort present in Datafin (above), where the Government had made it clear that the Takeover Panel was being deliberately absorbed into its regulatory strategy, such that the lack of a statutory basis was a 'complete anomaly': at 835 (Donaldson MR). 
Conclusion
It is not surprising that in
Holmcroft their Lordships recognised that the amenability principles are not always easily applied. The courts continue to assert the formal position that the overriding concern is the nature of the function, while the analyses themselves -in all three cases -continue to accord significant weight to institutional and/or source-based considerations.
53. The precise weight to accord the various considerations in play is, moreover, a matter of some uncertainty. Since the multi-factorial approach involves balancing factors together rather than attempting to fashion bright-line rules about when review will and will not lie, even clear trends that are firmly rooted in the case-law are capable of being outweighed in a given case if the circumstances are thought to demand it. One has sympathy with William Davis J in Macleod for deciding the amenability point on the basis of Weaver alone, thereby avoiding a foray into the morass of amenability case-law that has steadily accrued since Datafin. There is no guarantee that such an exercise would have provided any clearer guidance as to how to resolve the issue.
54. Holmcroft, Macleod and Worcester Cathedral are largely orthodox judgments that amply illustrate the challenge facing judges in this area of law. Especially given the theoretical difficulty inherent in determining the meaning of a public function, a sense of 'feel' or 'instinct', as well as close reference to the facts of the individual case, will inevitably -and perhaps frustratingly -remain a staple part of the courts' approach.
